Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 1

Issue 2

Article 8

4-1-1984

Philosophy's Bowl of Pottage: Reflections on the Value of Faith
Richard E. Creel

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Creel, Richard E. (1984) "Philosophy's Bowl of Pottage: Reflections on the Value of Faith," Faith and
Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 1 : Iss. 2 , Article 8.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil19841224
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol1/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

PHILOSOPHY'S BOWL OF POTTAGE:
REFLECTIONS ON THE VALUE OF FAITH
Richard E. Creel
If you were given an opportunity to choose between (1) knowing the way reality
is and (2) having enduring faith that there is a God in the classical theistic sense, on
the condition that you could not have both and your choice would be irreversible,
which would you choose? I hope to receive many responses to this question, but
for the next few pages please allow me to share with you my own reflections on
these alternatives.
If I choose to know the way reality is and it turns out to be a way that depresses
me, there will be a sense in which my knowledge has not helped me but wounded
me without hope of healing-surely a good reason to think twice about making that
choice. If I choose faith in God, then, as Cardinal Newman might put it, I may
have difficulties with my faith, but I will not have doubts. No matter what happens
to me or around me, I will have confidence that all things "work together for the
good of those who love God." Moreover, ifI have such a faith in God, then even
when I do not feel happy, I will be confident that nonetheless I am richly blessed
and will not be ultimately abandoned. Moreover, even if! feel depressed, I can fly
by my instruments if I have faith; that is, I can trust that all is well even when I cannot see for sure that it is. Best of all, I will feel this way even if there is no God!
Very well, so I want to be happy and therefore would prefer the confidence of
faith to the risk of knowledge, but which way ought I to choose? Don't we have a
moral obligation to choose knowledge over ignorance? My knee jerk response is
"yes, we do." My considered judgment is "no, we don't." I see no way to justify
the claim that we ought to seek every kind of knowledge. The world would not be
better off for knowing how to torture infants just short of rendering them unconscious. The world would not be better off for knowing how many names there are
in the Ottowa telephone directory that end in "d" and also contain an "a". Surely
we have no obligation to seek such knowledge. Therefore we have no obligation to
seek all knowledge.
A critic might reply. "But just as surely the question of the nature of reality is a
more significant question than that of random names in a phone book and is not an
odious question like that of methods for torturing the innocent. Further, just because we are not obligated to seek all knowledge it does not follow that we have no
obligation to seek any know ledge. Perhaps there are special items of know ledge
that we do have an obligation to seek."
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Perhaps so, but do we have an unqualified obligation to seek above all things
knowledge of the nature of reality? If we did have such an obligation it would follow that in a situation in which I felt that I was onto something very important
about the nature of reality but was interrupted mid-stream by my wife infonning
me that our child had suddenly come down with a life-threatening fever, I should
first finish my thoughts or reading before rushing my child to the hospital. But
surely such an implication is morally repugnant. At best, then, it might be that we
have an obligation to seek knowledge of the nature of reality whenever that pursuit
does not conflict with a higher obligation. Hence, we must ask, do we have a
higher obligation to seek faith or knowledge?
Speaking abstractly, it seems to me that my highest moral obligation is to believe and live in a way that is compatible with and supportive of the supreme value;
the supreme value, I believe, is universal happiness. I This entails that I should hold
beliefs, or at least have hopes, that are compatible with and supportive of this possibility. Now certainly the achievement of universal happiness is possible in some
significant sense if there is a God. It mayor may not be possible if there is not a
God. If there is not a God and therefore universal happiness may not be possible, I
would rather not know it; I would rather have faith that there is such a being and
that therefore universal happiness is possible. My highest moral obligation, then,
is not to seek knowledge but to honor the good. Should someone try to take away
my faith in the reality of the good by attempting to persuade me that the truth about
reality is such that we cannot rejoice in it, I would and should resist with all my resources. If my own mind begins to assualt me with doubts in addition to difficulties, I should belittle its powers. After all, it is plausible that the devil would attempt to manipulate my mind to destroy my faith, but it it not plausible that he
would give me faith-a force that can mock him, laugh at him, and outlast him.
Is it, then, ever morally pennissi!Jle to choose ignorance over knowledge? Yes,
it is whenever we are faced with mutually exclusive alternatives and the alternative
that would involve ignorance would also involve a value greater than that of
knowledge of the nature of reality. What might such a value be? Universal fullness
of life. If life can be lived as fully and perhaps more fully by choosing something
that involves ignorance of x than by choosing something that involves knowledge
of x, then we should choose the alternative that involves ignorance of x.
I Now let's approach our question of the value of faith from a different angle. If
you had a deep and abiding faith in the existence of God, for what would you trade
it? Would you trade it for knowledge of the nature of reality? If you did, you might
discover that there is a God-in which case you would get back what you had
traded off-maybe; there is an important question as to whether knowledge that
there is a God would be as personalIy satisfying as faith that there is. As Pascal has
written, "The knowledge of God is very far from the love of Him," and as Kierkegaard has quipped, "To stand on one leg and prove God's existence is a very dif-
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ferent thing from going on one's knees and thanking Him."2 But if you chose
knowledge and discovered that there is no God, then you would have lost forever
the possibility of faith. Could the knowledge you had gained possibly be worth the
loss sustained? Wouldn't a person have to be foolish to trade off his faith in God for
anything else?
Recall the words offaith by St. Paul in Romans 8. He begins by asking, "Shall
tribulation or distress or persecution or famine or nakedness or peril or sword separate us from the love of God?" "No," he peals out, "in all these things we are more
than conquerors through him who loved us. For I am sure," he continues, "that
neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor things present, nor
height, nor depth, nor any thing else in all creation, will be able to separate us from
the love of God ... "Recall the insights of Leo Tolstoy, who after a period of suicidal depression wrote that though faith had not lost its unreasonableness for him,
he had come to realize that faith alone gives us answers to the questions of life, and
consequently gives us the possibility of living. It is in consequence of faith, he
wrote, that "man does not destroy himself, but lives."3 Recall the words of Carl
Jung who wrote,
No matter what the world thinks about religious experience, the one who
has it possesses the great treasure of a thing that has provided him with a
source of life, meaning and beauty and that has given a new splendor to
the world and to mankind. He has pistis [faith] and peace. Where is the
criticism by which you could say that such a life is not legitimate, that
such experience is not valid and that suchpistis [faith] is mere illusion? Is
there, as a matter of fact, any better truth about ultimate things than the
one that helps you to live?'
Recall all these words and then ask, "What could possibly be of greater value than
faith, or even equal to it?" And if it is the pearl of supreme value, wouldn't it be
supremely unreasonable to trade it for anything else? Doesn't reason itself require
that we place faith above knowledge?
One implication of my analysis is that I should fight with all my heart, soul,
mind, and strength to defend that most precious gift called faith. I believe this sentiment explains the vigor of apologetics in the history of religions. It also helps explain the attacks of believers upon reason. Consider Lev Shestov' s attack in Athens
and Jerusalem upon the lust for knowledge. Consider Karl Barth's conviction that
faith cannot convince reason; it can only preach to it. Consider Luther's insistence
that we must tear out the eyes of reason. Perhaps Barth's instinct was right: to enter
seriously into rational dialogue about one's faith is already to have succumbed to
the eyes of the snake of reason. If so, then obviously it is critically important to
keep clear the distinction between apologetics (which is a defensive action by
which one protects one's great treasure) and rational dialogue (which is an enter-
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prise in which one submits to the rules of reason and is prepared to abandon the
thesis with which one begins as soon as it is shown to be "unreasonable").
I used to disdain the apologist because he appeared on the one hand to be hypocritical (by presenting the appearance of entering seriously into dialogue with the
nonbeliever while not in fact doing so) and on the other hand to be afraid (afraid to
submit his faith to unqualified philosophical scrutiny, lest it be shown to be false or
questionable). But now I see another side to the apologist's fear and reserve. The
believer is wisely loathe to enter into dialectic with the unbeliever because he
knows his own weakness and ignorance. He knows that by entering such dialectic
seriously he is placing himself into a situation in which he might lose his most precious possession-not because it is not most precious, but because he might not be
able to see through the arguments of the unbeliever and become paralyzed by
them, or because God might correctly see his willingness to run such a risk as a
kind of hubris or foolhardiness or promiscuousness and withdraw His gift of faith.
After all, if our petition that we not be led into temptation is sincere, then surely we
will not walk into it with our eyes wide open! Preach to the unbeliever, sure; converse with him, yes; enter into dialogue with him-up to a point; but when the
chips are down and you've got nothing left to gamble with but your pearl of great
price, for goodness sake walk away from the table. It would be the height of folly
to make such a wager merely for the sake of a final effort to win over the unbeliever. And if that's not the motive, what is it? Are you trying to prove something
to yourself? And if so, aren't you jumping off temples, commanding stones to tum
into loaves of bread, falling down and worshipping reason in expectation that if
you do then at last you can have your great treasure as a possession rather than a
gift?
Regarding the appearance of hypocrisy on the apologist's part, I now believe
that sometimes my belief that a believer had only been pretending to engage in rational dialogue was a result of my hasty assumption that because he was willing to
talk with me about his faith, he was accepting the rules of philosophical dialogue,
and in particular the rule that belief should be proportioned to evidence. Then
when I would notice the believer "click off' at some point in the dialogue, I would
feel that he had never really been serious about our discussion; that he had only
been playing me along until he could tell whether I might be won over. No doubt
some believers do enter conversations with non-believers in this self-conscious,
scheming way, but more often, I now suspect, when the believer "clicks off' in
mid-dialogue it is because he has begun to sense that something dangerous has
begun to occur. The apologist's halt, I suspect, is based on a dim feeling that to
continue would be to cooperate with the unbeliever in disabusing himself of his
most precious possession; obviously a foolish thing to do. Just as obviously, no
one can be certain that he will maintain his faith forever, but at least one can do his
best to ensure that if he ever does lose his faith he will not have been party to the
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forces that breached his wall. To relate my point to a different context, I will not
participate in an effort to prove that my father has done something awful. Others
may have an obligation to provide such proof, but my obligation is to stand by and
defend my father. To be sure, maybe he did do something awful, and maybe there
isn't a God, but to cooperate in an attack upon my father or my faith would be to
betray those relationships and make them impossible.
For these kinds of reasons, dialogue between believer and non-believer almost
always reaches a point beyond which the believer is not willing to go. This point,
I have suggested, is the point at which the believer begins to feel that he would be
passing over from showing that his position has rational merit or that the nonbeliever's position has rational problems to taking seriously the possibility that his
faith is untrue. At that point the believer breaks off the conversation in one way or
another and the non-believer becomes frustrated because he feels that he had the
believer on the run. From the nonbeliever's point of view the believer just got up
and walked away from the chess game in which he would have been checkmated in
a few more moves! From the believer's point of view , ifhe had played any further
he may have actively participated in bringing about the capture of his own king,
and since the believer's ultimate objective is not to capture his opponent's king but
to protect his own, he is satisfied to walk away with an unfinished game or a draw.
After all, philosophical dialogue is just a game; it settles nothing finally about the
nature of reality. And just because one believer couldn't figure a way to save his
king does not mean that it couldn't have been done by ano!her believer. I am reminded of a Catholic friend with whom I had a rousing debate in our sophomore
year of college. His final response was that I ought to go talk to some priests he
knew. "Those guys," he said, "have all the answers."
Certainly I would rather that my religious life, like that of my friend, be based on
faith than on the ebb and flow of evidence that must be weighed by reason from day
to day. I would rather live with the illusion that the good is real and ultimate than
with the knowledge that it is not; therefore I would prefer such an illusion to an opportunity to know whether my faith is an illusion or not. Is this a cowardly, undignified attitude? I don't think so. Isn't dignity a laughable virtue whenever it is
purchased at the price of one's happiness? Isn't it a stodgy thing compared to the
foolishness of faith? And where is the courage in conceding what the evidence indicates? Doesn't it take more courage to knowingly swim against the evidence than
to go along with it? To be sure, I am familiar with the contempt that people like
Freud and Sartre heap upon religious faith, but why should I care what they say if
accepting what they say would crush the buoyancy out of my life?
I agree with Aristotle that we should "strain every nerve to live in accordance
with the best thing in us," but I do not agree with him that reason is the best thing
in us. Rather, I believe that the best thing in us is our vision of the good, and that vision is not a product of reason, nor is it subject to the scrutiny of reason. It is a
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given, a revelation, and a standard by which reason itself is to be judged. Consequently, we should above all value faith that our vision of the good is veridical.
In conclusion, the trusting though aching heart of the believer in the face of evil
is based on faith that there is One who can and will reconcile history with perfect
goodness. Evil presented as evidence against the existence of God is irrelevant to
the believer because to have faith that there is a God is to have faith that there is
One by whom all the evils of history can be justified and will be overcome. Faith,
then, is the solvent in which the previously impenetrable shell of the problem of
evil begins to dissolve and reveal a vulnerable core. By this inaugural effect faith
takes away the terror of history, makes life rich in the best of circumstances and
possible even in the worst of them. Above all, then, it is faith, not knowledge, that
we should value and pray for.
Ithaca College

NOTES
1. When I speak of happiness as an ideal, I am speaking of moral happiness, i.e., happiness acquired
and enjoyed within the limits of morality. So as not to overexercise my critics, I shall leave "morality,"
"happiness," "God," and other notions undefined here.
2. W. H. Auden, ed., The Living Thoughts of Kierkegaard (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1963), p. 29.
3. Richard E. Creel, Religion and Doubt (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1977).
p.40.

4. Ibid., p. 110.

